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ABSTRACT
Online safety regularly depends on users’ ability to know ei-
ther where a URL is likely to lead or identify when they are on
a site other than they expect. Unfortunately, the combination
of low URL reading ability in the general population and the
use of hard-to-detect approaches like look-alike letters makes
the reading of URLs quite challenging for people. We design
a Slack bot, named Faheem, which assists users in identifying
potentially fraudulent URLs while also teaching them about
URL reading and common malicious tactics. In this work, we
describe the design of the bot and provide an initial evaluation.
We find that Faheem does a good job of interactively help-
ing users identify issues with URLs, but Faheem users show
minimal retention of knowledge when they lose access to the
tool.
ACM Classification Keywords
H.5.m. Information Interfaces and Presentation (e.g. HCI):
Miscellaneous; K.6.5. Management of Computing and Infor-
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INTRODUCTION
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) are how the majority
of internet citizens find information on the world wide web.
“Linking” between web pages, chat messages, social media, or
even emails is a common method of telling someone else how
to find a piece of content. When asked to visit a physical space
in the real world using a provided address, most people are
able to pull up a map in advance which allows them to answer
important questions like: “How far away is it?” or “Does
Google Maps think that there really is an Office Depot there?"
But with an online URL, people seem to have more difficulty
asking and answering basic questions about the location they
are visiting, for example: “Is this really the website for Office
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Depot?” or “Will my password be sent to the website safely
so no one else can read it?”
The goal of Faheem is to help people understand the content
of URLs so that they can ask and answer questions about the
URL, in particular, where it leads.
There are various reasons why understanding URLs can be
useful, ranging from avoiding being Rickrolled to being able
to identify when personal information is being sent in the
URL. Phishing is likely the most financially impactful use
case. Phishing attacks involve scammers attempting to obtain
users’ sensitive information for malicious reasons, with the
individuals behind such attacks seeking to deceive users into
visiting websites that impersonate legitimate ones [17]. One
of the many reasons phishing works is that users cannot accu-
rately read a URL to determine if it really is associated with
an organization they interact with or not [8, 25].
Phishing is also quite expensive, costing the United Kingdom
(UK) economy as much as £280 million a year [6]. Only
about 72% of consumers in the UK even know what “phishing”
is even though 92% of organizations report training users to
identify and avoid phishing attacks [3]. Which is wise, since
98% of attacks involving a social element use phishing [2].
With the evolution of social media, instant messaging ser-
vices, such as Slack and WhatsApp messengers, have become
the main communication means between friends, relatives
and colleagues [13]. These services allow end users to share
links and files. However, on the heels of the adoption of
such features, phishing on these new channels has become a
threat [26]. More specifically, the manipulation of URLs is
a popular phishing approach [11] which takes advantages of
people’s vulnerabilities when interacting with technology, and
the characteristics of URLs, which makes it difficult for users
to interpret them correctly in order to distinguish legitimate
websites from those that are spoofed [21]. For example, URLs
are read both left to right (path) and right to left (domain),
URLs can be shortened, or URLs can be represented by an IP
address, all of which is confusing for users [27].
We present here a new Slack chatbot called Faheem which
helps users by parsing URLs for them and explaining the URL
elements in a user-friendly way. The goal of Faheem is to both
assist a user during a regular chat communication, and help
them learn useful URL reading techniques. Ideally, a more
polished version of Faheem could be installed on a company
public Slack channel to provide contextual information about
the various URLs being shared and protect employees from
erroneously visiting problematic URLs.
We test Faheem against a simplistic URL explanation web
page – called URL Explainer – and find that Faheem does a
better job of supporting people interactively as well as helping
them to retain the knowledge.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Uniform Resource Locators (URL)
A URL is a structured description of the location of a digi-
tal resource [5] as pictured in Figure 1. Note that URLs do
not state where the resource is actually located, merely how
to go about locating it, the difference is subtle but a key to
understanding some of the design decisions. For example,
URLs can contain usernames and passwords, this information
is necessary to locate resources behind a login prompt, but
strictly speaking, has nothing to do with the actual location
of the resource. Similarly, the query string exists so that the
requester can pass strings to the host computer and get back
the desired resource. Again, query strings help locate the re-
source in places like databases but do not strictly describe the
actual resource location. When reading URLs the distinction
becomes important because some URLs are actually the loca-
tion of a second URL (redirection), such that a basic reading
is insufficient to learn the final destination.
At a high level, end-user issues around URL readability focus
on: 1) who or what is being communicated with (host, port),
2) what is being said (username, password, path, query string),
and 3) how it is being said (protocol). Who is being communi-
cated with is typically a fraudulent communication (phishing)
issue where the malicious actor is trying to trick the user into
going to the wrong host. What is being said is typically a pri-
vacy issue where more information is communicated than the
user would like, such as communicating unique marketing IDs
via query strings which can include anything the URL creator
wants. For example, the HealthCare.gov site which is used by
United States citizens up for health care allows users to click
on links which take them to different private insurer websites.
Those links were found to include information like pregnancy
status in the URL query string, effectively sending sensitive
data from inside of HealthCare.gov to a private insurer the
user had no current relationship with [22]. This behaviour
is insecure as the query could be saved in server logs and
the browser’s history log, which is a potential confidentiality
breach [28]. The last issue is about how the information is
said which is typically an issue of encryption (http vs. https).
In this paper, the primary focus of Faheem is to raise users
awareness of the who issue, notably, the phishing techniques.
URL Manipulation Tricks
Phishers will often use URL manipulation approaches to make
the URLs they send people look legitimate and deceive the
victim into believing they are visiting a trusted website [11].
The following are a set of common tactics used to hide the
malicious destination of a URL [14, 27]:
• Obfuscate: The company name is not visible in the URL,
which could be owing to the use of the IP address in a
hostname part, or shortened or redirected links.
• Mislead: The expected company name is embedded some-
where in the URL where the user can see it – possibly in
the subdomain, pathname or credentials – but that company
is not the destination of the URL.
• Mangle: The company name has letter substitution, mis-
spelling or non-ASCII characters (similar to English ones),
resulting in visually identical web addresses, known as a
Homograph attack [16].
• Camouflage: The company name contains an extension in
the domain name, such as a different top-level domain or
deliminator-looking character other than the normal period;
this is usually done with the addition of a hyphen. For exam-
ple, the use of home-depot.com instead of homedepot.com.
Detecting Malicious URLs
The work related to detecting malicious URLs falls into two
main approaches: automated detection and user training.
Automated Phishing Detection
Automated phishing detection uses a combination of many
factors to detect phish, which includes the URLs in the com-
munication. These detection tools are used by various groups.
Large organizations will use them to scan all incoming com-
munication such as email and proactively remove communica-
tions that are known to be fraudulent. Individual users can also
download tools for their browsers and other communication
clients that will identify fraudulent communication and either
remove or warn about it [17]. There are also bots, such as
MetaCert, which scans communications in Slack channels [1].
Most phishing identification procedures depend on Blacklists,
meaning a list of phishing URLs [20]; however, these tools do
not prevent zero-hour attacks, which is the attack before the
malicious URL is discovered [17]. The Anti-Phishing Work-
ing Group revealed that the normal time taken to discover a
phishing URL is 28.75 hours, during which time users are
unprotected [9]. These tools can sometimes give false warn-
ings that decrease users’ trust in the results and cause them
to ignore future warnings; consequently, the effectiveness of
these tools relies on users’ behaviour [12].
Training Users
While automation is a good idea, and effective, it is currently
impossible to completely remove the user from the loop. Com-
munication is an important part of business operations and
overly aggressive automatic filters are likely to cost organiza-
tions in lost productivity. As a result, some phishing attempts
will get through the automated filters, necessitating the train-
ing of users as a second complementary line of defence. There
are two common types of training: upfront and embedded.
In upfront training, a user will go through a training ses-
sion where they will learn about phishing in a condensed
format. Examples include the Anti-Phishing Phil game [25]
and NoPhish app [7] both of which train users to read URLs
using concentrated engagement, such as a game. The upfront
approach effectiveness relies on the user being able to under-
stand the materials, retain them, and be able to apply them to
daily activity. Prior work demonstrates that upfront training
is effective when it comes to enhancing users’ capability to
URL Structure
Protocol
Credential	 Host	 Path	
Username	
(Optional)	
Password	
(Optional)	
Hostname	
Port	
(Optional)	 Pathname	
Query	
Strings	
(Optional)	Subdomain(s)	(Optional)	 Domain	
Top	Level	
Domain	
http							:	//	 user								:		pass	123	@						www.mobile .		google						. com									:							80											/	a/b/c/d	?	 Id=1213	
Figure 1: URL structure and example.
identify phishing URLs; however, the long-term benefit of this
approach is uncertain [17]. Importantly, this approach can fail
to produce a long-term advantage [18] because of the nature of
forgetting [17]; along these lines, Volkamer et. al [27] recom-
mends that users need to integrate training into their daily life.
Another issue is that people are unwilling to invest energy in
online instructional exercises, particularly given the perceived
low risk of being exposed to real danger [10, 15, 27].
Embedded training involves integrating the training into the
daily life of the users. The most classic example of which is
sending out fake phishing emails to employees and provid-
ing contextual training for those who click on the links [19].
Unlike upfront training, embedded training is fairly lite, re-
quiring small amounts of time for most users and more time
only for users who click the malicious links. However, due
to its lite touch, users may not get the opportunity to build a
strong conceptual model of how phishing works; making the
lessons harder to apply in different contexts. Because this kind
of training is embedded in routine, it is challenging to create
consistent security training messages across an organization or
worse, between organizations, potentially leaving users with
conflicting advice [15, 23].
FAHEEM BOT DESIGN
The objective of this work is to develop and test Faheem: a
Slack bot with the capacity to parse URLs posted in a Slack
channel and clarify their components. It also warns users
about suspicious patterns using friendly explanatory language
that users can understand.
Our primary design objective is to create an interactive chat
bot which helps average internet users correctly read URLs
and identify phishing URLs. In order to accomplish this goal
we focus on two features of the bot:
1. Parsing the URLs and identifying common malicious be-
haviours focusing primarily on the domain issues.
2. Presenting the results to the user in a clear and easy to
understand manner.
Platform
We selected Slack as the platform for the bot because Slack is
a commonly used communication platform with good support
for custom bots. Slack bots can join any group, read and post
messages and also contact members in direct messages.
URL Parser
The URL parser uses the Node.js programming language. The
detailed processes for the URL analysis is as follows:
1. Listens to all Slack chats in the forum and extracts URLs
using url-regex package.
2. Identifies and resolves IP address. The ip-regex package was
used to detect IP address while the dns constructor package
was used to reverse it to obtain the registered hostname.
3. Checks and resolves redirects and shortened links using the
unfurl-url package to obtain the destination URL.
4. Parses the final URL into its component parts as shown in
Figure 1 by using the built-in URL constructor provided by
node.js.
5. Checks the domain for similarity with domains of the top
500 websites on Alexa Global Sites. Using the Levenshtein
distance metric from clj-fuzzy package.
6. Checks for non-ASCII characters using the non-ascii and
langdetect packages.
Walkthrough Example
For clarity, we detail here a sample interaction between the
Faheem bot and a user Alex also pictured in Figure 2.
The user Alex starts the interaction by posting a URL into a
Slack group the bot is listening to, which Faheem then detects.
Faheem parses the URL and presents the most important infor-
mation to Alex first with an offer of further details on request.
In this case, Faheem detected that the subdomain is similar to
popular domain google and warns the user that this URL will
not go to Google. It also detects a small edit distance between
the domain ’instaran’ and the popular domain ’instagram’,
which it points out to Alex along with actionable advice on
what to do if she is unsure. Finally, it provides positive feed-
back that the URL uses HTTPS and is therefore encrypted in
transit.
Alex wants more details so she replies with “details”. Fa-
heem expands each of the previously presented sections and
provided general advice for users, such as: “To clarify, the
hostname is similar to reading the home address, etc” in order
to help them develop conceptual understanding to deal with
security risks.
Alex is confused about the Protocol section and asked Faheem
about it by typing: “protocol”. Faheem responds by explaining
what a protocol is, particularly clarifying about HTTP.
Alex
Alex
Alex
Figure 2: An example interaction with the Faheem bot.
Explanation of Design Choices
Simple initial information Users need to receive information
just at the time they need it, especially since people may
struggle to remember information that they have received
out of context [4]; therefore, on detection of URLs, Faheem
presents a concise summary format of the key information
and replacing the technical concepts with terms which can be
understood by average users. The key information and format
of the summary were agreed by a focus group of security and
HCI experts. Domain issues are quite serious security wise
as the user may be communicating with someone other than
they intend [27]. Hence, Faheem focuses initial information
on issues around the domain including warnings for known
malicious URL tricks, as shown in Figure 3.
User-lead interaction Faheem gives the users a chance to ask
for details in general or for specific information. The goal is to
make the interaction user-lead where the user can decide what
they are most interested in seeing rather than provide piles
of information up-front. Conceptual explanations are also
provided to help people build relations between concepts and
assist with applying to learned lessons to new situations [24].
Highlight most problematic elements with evidenceWhere
possible, Faheem uses evidence from the URL itself to demon-
strate potential issues to users in such a way that they can
understand the issue and bring their own expertise to bear.
For example, Faheem checks for non-ASCII characters and
when found it points out to the user that there are, say, Cyrillic
letters in a mostly ASCII URL and shows them which letter
is non-ASCII. Other problems like potential misspellings of a
common domain are also contextualized by stating both the
domain in the URL and the common one so that the user can
compare them by themselves. Moreover, where best practices
exist, Faheem provides expert advice and positive reinforce-
ment of certain actions. For example. HTTPS is almost always
a better choice than HTTP so Faheem puts a green check mark
to indicate that having HTTPS is a good feature of the URL.
Explanation with advice Faheem provides general and ac-
tionable advice. The general advice follows the clarifications
to help users to deal with URLs. For example, not to send
sensitive data through a HTTP connection. Users are advised
to take an action when they doubt a URL (procedural knowl-
edge). This provides them with clear choices and potentially
increases their ability to differentiate the original from the
spoof URL. For example, Faheem advises them to Google the
domain if they are unsure about its safety.
URL EXPLAINER DESIGN
URL Explainer is a website created by one of the authors as a
class project when studying abroad. It takes in a URL, feeds it
into the URL.js parser, and presents the results on a webpage.
Each presented element of the URL is pulled out separately
onto different lines where the components are highlighted and
a generic explanation provided. URL Explainer also attempts
to fetch the URL server-side to get its title and preview. An
example can be seen in Figure 4.
A small pilot was run with 14 university students to see if
URL Explainer could be used to improve URL reading skills.
The study had a simple three-part format, with a pre-test, a
test where they could use URL Explainer, and a post-test.
We found, unsurprisingly, that participants are bad at identi-
fying the destination of a URL; participants had an average
accuracy of just over 50% in the pre-test. When using URL
Explainer, participants jumped to 100% accuracy while the
control condition which had no assistance stayed at 50% ac-
curacy. Unfortunately, when URL Explainer was taken away,
experimental participants dropped to an accuracy of 54% com-
pared to the control which had a post-test accuracy of 34%.
The overall take away from the study was that URL Explainer
did help people correctly identify the end destination of the
URL, but using it did not lead to skill building or retention.
In this paper, we will be using URL Explainer as a control
condition to compare Faheem with. We selected URL Ex-
plainer as a control condition because it is comprehensive,
simplistic, and shown to be effective at helping a user read a
(a) IP-address (b) Misspelling
(c) Multilevel domain (subdomains) (d) Non-ASCII characters in the domain
Figure 3: Sample Faheem messages for different malicious URL patterns.
Figure 4: URL Explainer interface after the user has asked it
to parse an Ars Technica news article URL where “www” has
been added as a subdomain to show the URL redirect notice.
URL. Unlike Faheem, URL Explainer makes no attempt to
identify Phishing indicators or provide contextual information,
instead focusing solely on factual presentation of the contents
of the URL itself. As such, it is a good choice for a control.
METHODS
An empirical lab study was conducted to investigate the overall
effectiveness of Faheem’s interactive explanations in raising
users awareness of phishing URLs as compared to a basic
presentation.
We hypothesise that Faheem users show a greater improve-
ment, compared to URL Explainer users, in their ability
to identify phishing URLs in the following two conditions:
(i) With the support of the tool (Faheem or URL Explainer).
(ii) When access to the tool has been removed.
Participant Recruitment
A request was posted by the lead researcher on their ac-
counts for Twitter, WhatsApp, and Facebook. As a motivation,
prospective participants were told that they would be awarded
£10 for their participation. Only three people were located
locally, the others were from a wide variety of countries in-
cluding Saudi Arabia and parts of the European Union. The
participants were from a variety of sectors including mathe-
matics, business, and management. A total of 40 participants
were recruited, 20 for each group, all of whom were aged
between 20 and 58 years old with a mean of 28. 60% were
female and 40% male.
Study Design
Because of the wide geographic locations of the participants,
the study was conducted remotely with the researcher com-
municating with the participants via email and Slack using a
pre-defined script which differed between conditions only in
the explanation of the functionality of the systems.
Protocol
Setup: The study purpose was explained to the participants
from each group, as well as what phishing is if they were not
already aware. They were explicitly told to not visit any of the
links, only to read them. They were also asked at the end of the
study if they had used any external resources. Participants in
the Faheem condition were asked to join a Slack team before
the study started in attempt to limit the communication means
between researcher and participants and ensure smooth study
flow. They were invited to an empty Slack channel to which
Faheem was added later in the study.
Demographics: Participants in both groups started the session
with a consent form and a demographics survey where they
were asked for their Slack username (Faheem) or preferred
first name for communication (control), age, gender and topics
they have previously studied, with two additional questions in-
corporated for the experimental group, asking how frequently
they use Slack and chatbots to ensure their understanding of
Slack and chatbots would not influence the study results.
Pre-test: Participants were given a set of 14 URLs one at
a time via a survey and instructed to imagine that they had
received each URL during an instant messaging interaction
with the text “You want to visit <website name>” associated
with the URL. For each URL the participants answered the
following questions:
1. Decide whether it is a phishing or an original website.
Select one: phishing, original
2. Which part of the link does influence your answer?
Multi-answer: all elements of URL, except the protocol,
were provided as choices.
3. Why would you click / not click on the link?
Free-text answer.
The goal of these questions was to determine their a-priory
ability to determine if the URL went to the stated organization
or not.
Supported reading: Participants were given access to either
a live version of Faheem or screenshots of URL Explainer
and asked to use them to answer the same set of questions
shown in the pre-test, but with a different set of URLs. For the
Faheem group, the participants were given access to Faheem
and told that a link would be posed in the group, which Faheem
automatically would parse, and questions were then sent in
the group chat. For the control group, members were given
a survey with screenshots of URL Explainer for the link in
question; screenshots were to ensure that easy access to URL
Explainer could be revoked during the post-test below. Since
URL Explainer produces static output, there is no functional
difference between the actual page and an image.
Post-test Similar to the pre-test, participants in both groups
were given a new set of URLs and asked to answer the same
questions from the pre-test without the support of the tool.
Participants were again asked to not type in URLs or use other
resources. Access to Faheem was revoked and URL Explainer
participants were asked if they had searched for the site online.
Tested URLs
In each of the pre, supported, and post stages the participant is
given a set of 14 URLs, which were selected to cover the fol-
Figure 5: Boxplot of the number of URLs participants cor-
rectly identified as phishing for conditions in the pre test, when
supported by the tool, and post test.
lowing phishing techniques: shortened links, redirects, IP ad-
dresses, misspellings, multi-level domains, company name lo-
cated somewhere other than the host position, and non-ASCII
characters. The three sets of URLs were selected to be compa-
rable in structure but not identical. Every participant saw the
same URLs in the same order. One URL from each stage was
excluded from analysis due to a technical issue during data
collection. Results are drawn from 13 URLs per stage.
RESULTS
Our primary concern is if Faheem helped participants to accu-
rately determine if a given URL lead to a particular company
or not, both while using Faheem and after. As can be seen in
Figure 5, participants were able to use both Faheem and URL
Explainer to improve their ability to identify potential phishing
URLs with more accuracy than they could without the tools.
To determine if the Faheem group experienced a significant
improvement compared to URL Explainer, we computed the
per-participant change between supported and pre to account
for initial skill variation. Then, we ran an independent t-test
with an a of .05. We found that the Faheem group (M=4.55)
showed statistically significantly more improvement than the
control group (M=2.15), (p<0.003), and fairly large effect size
(r=0.47).
We also looked at the difference between the pre and post
tests. Similar to the prior analysis, we computed the change
per participant and then compared using an independent t-
test. Faheem (M=2.75) still showed a statistically significant
improvement (p< a0.044) with (r=0.32) as compared to the
control (M=1.05). Though the difference between the condi-
tions narrowed after support was removed.
URL category Pre Supported Post
Control Faheem Control Faheem Control Faheem
Standard-URLs 43% 28% 83% 70% 58% 62%
IP-Based 80% 85% 70% 85% 85% 95%
Shortened links 15% 15% 30% 35% _ _
Redirects 25% 60% 65% 100% _ _
Misspelling 40% 48% 53% 100% 48% 88%
Multi-level domain 50% 40% 50% 80% 49% 50%
Company name not in host position 60% 58% 58% 75% 65% 70%
Non-ASCII characters 55% 55% 45% 100% 45% 90%
Table 1: URL identification accuracy for each condition, stage and type of URL issue presented. Participants were given an
organization name and asked if the URL went to that organization or if it was likely phishing. So the top left value should be read
as 43% of the standard URLs presented to the control group in the pre-test were correctly identified as the company or phishing.
As a reminder, participants were provided with a company
name and asked if the URL lead to that company or if it was
likely phishing. Table 1 shows the results of the question for
the different conditions, stages, and types of URL manipu-
lations. The pre-test results show that participants in both
conditions achieved the lowest scores for standard, shortened,
redirects and misspelt URLs.
For the supported stage, both groups scored lower for the
shortened link https://bit.ly/18AOiDE which redirects to
https://www.facebook.com/unsupportedbrowser. Participants’
justifications were different, with one of them stating “Bitly
always sends me to advertisement website”, and others stat-
ing that the link goes to Facebook but ‘unsupported browser’
in the link is suspicious. Both URL Explainer and Faheem
resolve shortened URLs, like the Bitly example above, and
tell the user the ultimate destination of the URL. Participants
in the supported stage clearly did not understand the feature
or it failed to overcome their previous biases as they still do
quite poorly at identifying phishing sites. One potential expla-
nation is technical. Both Faheem and URL Explainer make a
headless request to resolve the URL server-side. Doing so can
trigger behaviours in the host server. In the above example,
it caused Facebook to serve back its “unsupported browser”
page rather than the actual content, which was then reflected
in the two tools.
After using the tools, participants, in both groups, were seen
to experience problems when the links containing top-level
domains other than .com, such as tagesschau.de. The Faheem
participants who answered this question correctly said that they
Googled the domain, suggesting that the Faheem group did
benefit from the provided advice. The top-level domain .de
is the country code top-level domain for the Federal Republic
of Germany. Another URL was https://translate.google.co.uk/.
Participants who are not from the UK did not trust it with the
justification provided was that they had never seen a Google
website with these characters.
Moreover, the Faheem group of participants were confused
between the URL and the recognized brand name for the
organization, such as New York Times (www.nytimes.com/ )
whereas the other group’s performance was found to be higher
because the other tool provided a webpage title containing the
full website name.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have presented Faheem, a Slack bot which
helps users learn about URLs in an interactive format. Fa-
heem assists users who have no understanding of URLs in
identifying common URL elements and well known malicious
URL tricks. It also assists more experienced URL readers in
identifying less user-visible tricks such as non-ASCII letters
which are visibly identical to ASCII ones.
To test Faheem we compared it with URL Explainer, a sim-
plistic web page which parses a URL for a user but focuses
on a factual clear representation of the URL contents rather
than helping the user identify common issues. We find that
while using both tools, Faheem is better at helping a user iden-
tify URLs which have a destination other than where the user
wishes to go. Additionally, we also saw some minimal learn-
ing effects with Faheem users showing an improved ability to
identify phishing URLs after using the tool.
In conclusion, Faheem is a novel approach to helping users
understand the contents of URLs. Our study shows that the
approach has some promise, though more comprehensive stud-
ies are needed to conclusively determine the effectiveness of
Faheem-type solutions.
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